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Foreign and Defense Policy in the Obama Administration
Yesterday marked the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it's a testament 
to the durability of the NATO Alliance and to the value of partners like Portugal. 
Indeed, the United States has benefi ted greatly from the close security relationship 
we have across the Atlantic with Portugal, on everything from the airbase in the 
Azores to the Portuguese contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I am honored to 
be here before this distinguished group.
Before I begin my remarks, however, I need to give you a disclaimer, and that 
disclaimer is that these are my views and not the views of the Obama administration or of
the Department of Defense or any other agency of the US government. So I am speaking 
here on an individual basis, not as a representative of the US government.
Before I go into the specifi cs of the Obama administration's foreign and security 
policies, I want to set the scene a little bit, and to do that I want to review the 
international and domestic contexts within which we fi nd ourselves, review briefl y 
how policy is made in Washington. Having set that scene, I want to move to 
our three act play: the fi rst act being the policy process and how the process has 
changed; the second act being the foreign policy initiatives of this administration, 
the third act being the defense policies of this administration. I am happy to answer 
questions about specifi c policies, and I understand that there is a lot of interest in 
Afghanistan, after my prepared remarks. I will do so to the extent that I can in this 
open forum. So let’s get right to it.
First, let’s think about the complex strategic environment we fi nd ourselves in. 
I am going to argue today that there are really three important things that we need 
to consider. One is the changing security challenges over the last twenty years or 
so. Second is the effect of globalization. And third are questions of environmental 
issues and climate change. So let’s look at how these security issues have changed 
over time.
Today is the day after the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is useful 
to remember how, in many ways, the cold war was very simple. You had two sides 
with relatively predictable behavior between each side, and the confl ict between the 
two sides was fought predominantly through third parties. There was not a lot of 
direct confl ict. The world grew considerably more complex eight years ago, at least 
for the US. The 9/11 attacks were followed by the beginning of the Afghan confl ict 
in October 2001, Iraq in March 2003, the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the attacks 
in London in July 2005. The US found itself faced with a shadowy threat that had 
strike US soil, and nobody knew a lot about terrorism before 9/11. There were a 
few people in government who were experts but the general policy apparatus was 
not expert in any way on this. In short, the United States found itself fi ghting two 
wars and two close allies were struck by internal attacks.
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The situation has gotten even more complex, I would argue, in the last couple 
of years. Today's situation has things like Mexican narco-violence, a change in 
Honduran leadership, growing competition over the polar waters with climate 
change. Russia has been probing into the Baltic neighborhood. There is concern 
about European energy policy and energy dependence on Russia. There are arms 
control negotiations underway right now; a follow-on to the strategic arms limitation 
talks. There is concern about the Iranian nuclear program. There is, of course, the 
ongoing Arab Israeli dispute, there is continued unrest and crisis in Sudan, there is 
an insurgency going on in Pakistan, and there is the perennial problem associated 
with North Korean behavior.
The Michelle Flournoy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the United 
States, groups these, and a number of other crises, into fi ve categories. She argues 
that the fi rst category that we face in this new world is the threat of violent 
extremism. The second is the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The third are shifts in the balance of power, predominantly from the West to the 
East. The fourth is failed and failing states. And the fi fth is tensions in the global 
commons, as exemplifi ed by the growing competition over the polar resources. It 
is not self-evident to anyone, really, how the United States and anyone else should 
respond to these crisis and challenges. On some issues it's not even clear whether 
a response is possible.
Now let's complicate this picture even more. I know it does not seem like it's 
possible to complicate this picture but let's try. Let's look at globalization and a 
couple of different facets of globalization. One is migration patterns. To what extent, 
if it all, should states try and assimilate immigrant populations. How should it be 
done? What is the proper path? Is it the assimilation strategy of the French; is it 
the multicultural strategy of the British? What is the proper path with globalization 
and migration?
There is the question of globalization and those who are left behind. Consider 
this picture of a night time photograph, a satellite photo, of the Korean Peninsula. 
Look at South Korea, here with all the lights. And this dark area of the picture 
is North Korea. Globalization is producing haves and have-nots. What do we do 
about that?
Now let's consider two different aspects of environmental challenges. Just take 
for example the issue of water. Look at the water challenges that we are going to 
face over the next few years. China only has 8 per cent of the world's fresh water 
but it has a huge population. How do you provide fresh potable drinking water for 
that large population? India's water demand is going to double in the next fi fteen 
years. The Middle East is expected to have a decrease in available water.
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Next consider climate change, where there are incredibly sobering statistics. 
Global temperature may rise roughly 2 to 4 degrees centigrade, and that is a 
conservative estimate, by the year 2100. In that scenario, sea levels rise 18 to 59 
centimeters, precipitation increases in the northern latitudes but decreases near the 
equator, costal storms increase in severity, which combined with the rise of the sea 
level means that anyone living near the shore may have to rethink their real estate 
plans. To what extent should we prioritize arresting this trend or reversing this 
trend? What are we willing to do to solve this problem? And what are we willing 
to do during a global recession to solve this problem? This is a huge issue.
Now that I give you some glooming doom about the international environment, 
let’s talk about the new domestic environment in the United States; our second 
contextual element before we go on to the Obama administration’s policies. And I 
am going to argue that there 4 big things to consider.
First, the US is running a signifi cant budget defi cit and building up a signifi cant 
debt. The most dramatic rise in government's spending is from entitlement programs, 
to help the elderly and the poor, especially the costs associated with medical care, a 
big subject of debate in the United States right now. Here are some budget fi gures 
from the last several years. What the fi gures on the budget do not incorporate are 
the recent efforts to solve the fi nancial crisis over the last nine to 12 months that 
have happened in United States. So these fi gures do not include seven hundred fi fty 
billion dollars spent in the economic stimulus package. It doesn't include eighty 
one billion dollars spent to help automakers. It does not include roughly seven 
hundred fi fty billion dollars to help troubled fi nancial institutions stay solvent. Nor 
does it incorporate changes in interest on the debt that we hold, which will grow 
signifi cantly. Many have argued that this trend is not sustainable, so the question 
becomes what to do about it.
The second component is that the United States is showing signs of war fatigue. 
Wars and stability operations are incredibly costly. Consider the human cost. This 
is a chart that looks at casualties from 1991 to 2004 for major combat compared 
to stability operations. It does not include casualties from the last fi ve years. So 
the line on the right side would actually be much higher if you included current 
stability operations. Consider the fi nancial costs. War funding between 2001 and 
2009 has been roughly one trillion dollars, that is direct cost, if you include the 
current roughly one hundred thirty billion dollars that has been requested this year. 
But those direct costs don't include all the indirect costs that are accruing to the 
United States, such as interest on the debt, future recapitalization of equipment, 
equipment that is running out very quickly when you use it in war. You are going 
to have eventually to replace that equipment and that's going to cost you a lot 
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of money. There is medical care for our veterans who have served overseas and 
that is going to be an ongoing cost. And then there are the non-fi nancial costs, the 
opportunity costs, the political opportunity costs of focusing a lot of attention on 
particular foreign crises. People can only do so much, so attention may be taken 
away from other things.
One other thing about war fatigue: these are some recent numbers about United 
States public believes about operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is becoming 
a huge debate in the United States. The approval of the Obama administration's 
handling of the Afghan war has gone down over the last four months, by roughly 
seventeen per cent, to about forty fi ve per cent now. The belief that war is worth 
fi ghting, however, has stayed relatively constant, in high forties or low fi fties over 
the last four months. The public is evenly divided however on whether we should 
increase or decrease the number of troops in Afghanistan, at roughly thirty-seven 
per cent on each side, if you look at October polls. (I do not have numbers for 
November because the polls have not been released yet.) What it says to me is that 
the public is waiting for clues from the administration on what it wants to do, and 
the public could be swaged ether way.
Another thing to consider about the domestic environment that the United States 
is operating under is Congress, our legislators. Congress has certain constitutional 
powers that give it, sometimes, tremendous infl uence over foreign and security 
policy. Congress has to approve all budgets and all spending, and they can change 
those numbers from what the Administration has submitted to them. Sometimes 
they do so in dramatic fashion. Congress regulates all commerce and taxation. 
Congress can reject the appointment of senior offi cials, can include military offi cers 
if it wants to, and can put conditions on international treaties. Congress raises and 
regulates the armed forces, so they decide the eventual end-strength of the Army 
and the Marines, the Navy and the Air Force. They decide what equipment the 
military gets.
They have some non-constitutional powers that they have accrued over time. 
Congress conducts oversight of foreign policy initiatives. They can subpoena 
witnesses, they can force people to testify and they can swear them under oath, which 
is something that not all legislators in all parts of the world have the power to do. 
They have access to classifi ed information, which not all legislators in all countries 
have access to. They can commission independent analysis, both government run 
and outside the government, to assess an administration's initiatives. So Congress is 
also a player in security policy and we should not forget that. In fact, where money 
is involved Congress can have tremendous infl uence because of their control of the 
budget. They have the least amount of infl uence arguably during security crisis.
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And here are some examples of recent congressional infl uence. Right now there 
is legislation working its way through Congress to mandate sanctions on Iran. There 
have been demands for General McChrystal to come before Congress to testify 
as to his recommendations. There have been changes to weapons programs. And 
there have been limitations on what the administration can do with the detainees 
in Guantanamo. All of this can greatly complicate the life of any President, because 
you have another player you have to take into account.
Consider the example of Homeland Security. DHS stands for the Department 
of Homeland Security. On the right side of this picture are all the committees
and sub-committees of the US Senate that have oversight over this department. 
On the left side are all the committees and sub-committees of the House of 
Representatives that have oversight over the Department of Homeland Security. 
Roughly eighty six different congressional bodies can subpoena the leaders of the 
Department of Homeland Security, to come testify as to what the Department is 
doing to protect the Nation. That is a major drain on the ability of senior leaders 
to actually lead, as you spend all your time preparing for and participating 
in hearings. There is a potential for conflicting advice or direction from these 
various committees, whether it is the House versus the Senate, whether it is 
the appropriators who actually spend the money compared to the authorizing 
committees, who tell you the programs you are suppose to have. There are all 
sorts of competing influences.
Adding to this complicated process are the President's domestic priorities, and 
there are a lot of them and they are all very important. The economic stimulus that 
is working right now; the healthcare debate in our country; energy and climate 
legislation which is being considered right now, particularly in the US Senate; 
fi nancial regulation of banks and other fi nancial entities, it is working its way 
through Congress; then there is the ongoing process about fi lling senior leadership 
positions in the government, that still has not been completed; and to say nothing 
about all the duties that you have to attend to when you are running a massive 
government like the United States. This is all complicated.
It gets even more complicated with our third contextual factor: how policy is 
made in the US. In its simplest form, security policy involves three major players 
in the United States: the Defense Department (DoD), the State Department and the 
Intelligence community. And it is all coordinated by the National Security Council 
(NSC), the staff of which works for the President. In that simplest form, coordination 
involves executive branch agencies, foreign governments, Congress, nongovernmental 
organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. But that is the simplest form 
(which is not very simple). In reality we need to add more people.
Foreign and Defense Policy in the Obama Administration
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But before I add more people note that in the simplest form it is just those three 
entities. And even then there are still coordination problems. This is a map that 
shows the overlapping jurisdictions of the State and Defense Departments. The 
different colors are State Department bureaus, the different lines are the different 
combating commands of the military. Notice that US AFRICOM, for example, covers 
two different State Department bureaus. There is a lot of overlap and seams here. 
That can allow policy to slip through the cracks.
To resume, we need to add additional agencies to our basic model, we have 
to add Congress, we have other international partners, like Portugal. You have 
state and local governments in United States, particularly on issues of trade or 
homeland security. You have multinational fi rms and contractors; the United 
States government does often a lot of contracting, hiring private companies to do 
some of the government's work. You have foundations and corporations. So when 
you look at today's reality, a more accurate representation might look like this 
complicated slide, where you have Treasury, the department of Homeland Security, 
the department of Energy, the department of Commerce, in addition to Foreign 
Governments, the Offi ce of Management and Budget, and the Justice Department. 
It is very complicated. It looks like spaghetti.
It is hard to manage all of these interactions, much less be aware of all these 
interactions. Remember the map with the different regions of the world. Let’s 
complicate that map a little bit. This is the same map, but just adding one more 
agency, the US Agency of International Development. The lines on the map do 
not all match, so the coordination problem becomes even greater. I am not saying 
that these are insurmountable problems or challenges, but it does make a very 
complicated picture.
Again to quote, Michèle Flournoy, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, from 
a speech that she gave in late January: “The U.S. Government as a whole lacks 
established procedures for planning and conducting inter-agencies operations. Each 
new administration tends to reinvent this wheel. This ad hoc approach has kept the 
United States from learning from its mistakes and improving its performance in 
complex contingencies over time.”
Senior Obama administration offi cials understand these challenges and these 
problems. And when people discuss these challenges, they really think about fi ve 
big categories of challenges.
The planning process is the fi rst. In Michèle Flournoy's words, “The U.S. 
Government as a whole lacks established procedures for planning and conducting 
interagency operations.” We are constantly reinventing the planning process. Second, 
we tend to lack suffi cient coordination mechanisms across all these different entities. 
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Third, civilian government capacity is not what we would like it to be, particularly 
with the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Justice Department, the Treasury 
Department, and there is a long list of others. We would like to have greater civilian 
government capacity. Fourth, there are cultural differences across agencies and even 
within agencies. There is a joke, (and I apologize to my military colleagues, but I 
am going to make a joke at their expense) when you ask three different military 
services to secure a building, the Marines will kick in the doors, check the building 
and move on; the Army will launch an artillery barrage at the building, destroy it 
bulldoze the building and build a new building; the Air Force will come in, and 
check if there is air conditioning, television and a refrigerator. Cultural differences. 
Fifth and fi nally, there is the issue of information sharing. How do you ensure 
that government agencies are sharing information with one another? We have had 
this issue about getting our intelligence community, the sixteen agencies in the 
intelligence community, to share information with one another. Often they guard 
their information very closely. How do you get the State Department and the 
Defense Department to share information across agencies? This is to say nothing 
about the problem of how you get partner nations to share information with one 
another and with the United States, and how you ensure that the United States 
is sharing the appropriate information with the partner nations? All of these are 
crucial challenges.
Now I have painted a suffi cient gloomy picture that we might all just want to 
go have a drink, but instead I am going to keep you here for a little bit longer. Let’s 
look at how the administration is handling these challenges. There is a short term 
solution and a long term solution that the administration seems to be espousing. 
In the short term they are putting a lot of focus on the National Security Council 
and having the National Security Council and special presidential envoys run 
signifi cant policy initiatives. In the long term there are trying to change government 
to approach problems with whole-of-government coordination; what in other 
countries, particularly among our NATO allies, might be called a comprehensive 
approach. Let me talk about each of those briefl y.
In the short term, the administration is using presidential envoys and the National 
Security Council. Envoys are people how have been designated by the President to 
craft policy on a particular issue. We have had an envoy for Afghanistan/Pakistan, 
with Richard Holbrooke. We have had an envoy for the Middle East Peace Process 
with former Senator George Mitchell. We have envoys on Sudan. We have had 
envoys on climate change. We have a number of different envoys. The advantages 
here are that envoys are responsive to the President, they are not captured by 
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individual agency priorities or parochialism. The disadvantage, however, of envoys 
is that you might miss the expertise of a particular agency. And if you are crafting 
policy without vetting it through particular agencies, they might have been able 
to identify things that would be potential stumbling blocks.
The second area of emphasis in the short-term is the National Security Council. 
Let's look at the structure of the National Security Council (NSC). There are three 
types of committees in the NSC and they all contain representatives from the 
various national security agencies. At the lowest level are what we call IPCs, which 
stands for Interagency Policy Committees. These take proposals from individual 
agencies, talk about them among the different relevant foreign policy agencies 
and, if they all come to an agreement, great. If they cannot come to an agreement 
the policies are bumped up to the next level. The next level involves the deputies 
committees. Deputies committees involve the number two person in each of the 
relevant agencies. They decide on recommendations that come from the Interagency 
Policy Committee. If they cannot decide on something they will bump it up to the 
next level, the Principals Committee. These are the Cabinet heads of the relevant 
agencies, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, etc. They are the ones 
who decide on the more diffi cult questions.
The National Security Council has a staff and the Obama administration has 
organized the staff in a particular way. You can get clues about the administration's 
priorities by looking at how they coordinate their staff. There are a lot of acronyms, 
but I will highlight the important things. The traditional security directorates are 
Defense, Intelligence, International Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Then you 
have the Regional Directorates and this is pretty straight forward; this is similar 
to what previous administrations have had. You have new parts of the National 
Security staff. They deal with economics, environment and energy policy. Others 
deal with homeland security. These were formerly in a separate Homeland Security 
Council. They have been merged into the Obama NSC with the understanding that 
homeland security is part of national security. And you have part of staff dealing 
with new transnational issues that have been given their own directorates in the 
staff, which were not included in previous National Security Council structures, 
like global engagement, multilateral and human rights, WMD coordination or 
cyber-coordination. Those are short term solutions.
In the long term the administration is trying to change coordination across 
all government entities. For example, consider reconstruction and stabilization in 
post-confl ict environments. In Washington you would come up with an overall 
unifi ed US government plan, agreed to by all agencies in advance with individual 
mission elements given to individual agencies or groups of agencies. In the fi eld 
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level, you would have an integrated implementation plan, again staffed and decided 
upon by representatives from more than one agency.
Other related solutions include things like coordinating budgets and missions 
across agencies. For example, one proposal is to come up with a national security 
budget, rather than a separate defense department budget and a state department 
budget. You have one budget geared towards missions, not departments. Another 
example would be to have cross-training of people from one department going 
to another department for one or two years to learn how that other department 
works.
There are three big principles in my view (this is not an offi cial view from the 
Obama's administration) that I see in US foreign policy in this administration. One is 
engagement: the administration has been willing to engage with countries and entities 
that we were not previously been willing to engage with. The most recent example 
is that we have offered to have bilateral talks with North Korea, in preparation for 
the six party talks. That was something that was not necessarily smiled upon by 
previous administrations. A second is multilateralism. This administration believes 
in multilateralism, whether it is on coordinating a response to the allegations of an 
Iranian nuclear weapons program, climate change, fi nancial summits to deal with 
the global fi nancial crisis, or multilateralism on a lot of other issues. The third big 
principle is multi-tasking; doing many things at once, and this administration seems 
to thrive on that. They have a huge international agenda, everything I described 
above plus Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iraq, arms control negotiations with Russia 
(START follow-on), getting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty passed through the 
Senate, and getting the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty passed. There are a number 
of priorities here.
When we look at foreign policy, not defense policy, the US has a guiding 
document, called the National Security Strategy. It is supposed to be written 
every year. That never happens, it really gets written about every four years, and 
the new administration has yet to write theirs. But what we do have ongoing is 
called the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. It should be done in 
the next few months and, for the fi rst time it is focused on our diplomatic core. It 
is supposed to set out long term plans and to coordinate across the different US 
entities that deal with diplomacy and development and fi nancial assistance. How 
do you coordinate across those different agencies? What capabilities do you need 
in the long term that we do not have now? And how can you get your budget to 
refl ect those priorities? It was initiated by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who it 
is said was impressed with the military’s ability to do long range planning. Now 
we are going to try it with our diplomatic core.
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We have certain capabilities that we have to realize. The size of our Foreign 
Service is twelve thousand Foreign Service’s offi cers, and has almost ten thousand 
civil servants. But it is a relatively young diplomatic core. Just over half of them 
only have ten years of experience and about a third of them only have fi ve years of 
experience. We are staffi ng almost two hundred seventy diplomatic posts around 
the world. Many argue that this is insuffi cient and that we need to increase the 
size. In fact, the administration is adding forty one hundred new positions, mostly 
Foreign Service’s offi cers, and trying to come up with a deployable set of Foreign 
Service Offi cers who can go to hotspots around the world.
The new word in Washington on Defense Policy is Hybrid Warfare. Just as with 
overall foreign policy, defense policy has a number of reviews that are going on 
right now. The Quadrennial Defense Review happens every four years, and it sets 
the long range vision for the Defense Department. It is ongoing and it was resealed 
in February of 2010. The Nuclear Posture Review is also ongoing and will probably 
be released just after the Quadrennial Defense Review. Again the National Security 
Strategy is still to be written. But in terms of Hybrid Warfare, here are some quotes of 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that talk about Irregular Warfare equal to normal 
combat, that talk about managing a range of threats employed simultaneously, that 
talk about stability operations as a core military mission.
“When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the ‘high end’ from 
the ‘low end,’ the conventional from the irregular… In reality, one can expect to see more 
tools and tactics of destruction – from the sophisticated to the simple – being employed 
simultaneously.” Robert Gates, Foreign Affairs, January 2009.
The view here is that warfare in the future is not just going to be main battle 
tanks fi ghting a large conventional engagement, nor is it necessarily going to be 
improvised explosive devices planted in a road in Afghanistan. It is going to be a 
range of issues and we have got to be prepared to respond across that spectrum.
The administration's budget request for fi scal year 2010 refl ects the focus on 
hybrid warfare. It is a fl at budget. It does not increase a lot: roughly two billion 
dollars from this past year's budget. But it increases manpower. The size of the 
Army is growing to just under fi ve hundred fi fty thousand. The size of the Marines 
is growing to just over two hundred thousand. This refl ects the realization that 
in Hybrid Warfare you need more people on the ground than if you were just 
doing high-tech warfare from afar. Deployments are refl ecting also a shift from 
Iraq to Afghanistan. The administration is still considering General McChrystal's 
recommendations. In my view, there probably will not be an announcement on 
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this until the President gets back from his East Asia trip, so probably just before 
the third week of November.
Acquisition refl ects, also, a focus on hybrid warfare. We are slowing down the 
pace of ship acquisition. We are shifting aircraft acquisition to less sophisticated and 
less high-tech, though still cutting-edge, aircraft. We are stopping the production 
of the F22 fi ghter plane, probably the most sophisticated plane in the world. We 
are going, instead, to focus on the Joint Strike Fighter, which is a little bit less 
sophisticated in its technology, but is probably usable in more missions.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are slated to replace some of our older F16 fi ghter 
planes. Missiles Defenses are shifting from a focus on national defense to a focus on 
defending against short and medium range missiles. Programs that are considered 
wasteful like this fl eet of new presidential helicopters have been cut from the budget. 
We are also shifting acquisition priorities for ground forces. The army had a plan for 
a “Future Combat System.” Secretary Gates and the administration have basically 
cancelled the associated family of vehicles for that system: the new tanks, new 
personnel carriers, new light infantry vehicles that were planned for that system. 
They were seen as too expensive, too reliant on untested technology. Instead, they 
are focusing on things like MRAP vehicles. These are the Mine Resistant Armored 
Personnel vehicles that are being used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These priorities on Hybrid Warfare are refl ected in the defense budget. So you 
can see personnel costs are growing up. We are increasing the size of the ground 
force, in terms of the Army and the Marines. Current combat needs are being 
refl ected in the operations and maintenance budget. It too is going up. Procurement 
is higher, but it could be much, much higher had we not cancelled some of these 
expensive high-tech systems, or delayed their purchase.
Thank you for being attentive listeners. 
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